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RECENT CASES.
CARRMS-INJRy TO PASSENGERS-NEGLIGENCE OF PASSENGER-QUESTION
FOR JURY.-CLERE V. MORGAN'S L. & T. R. Co., 31 So. 886 (La.) .- Plaintff's
arm, projecting beyond the window sill of a moving steam railway car, was
injured by being struck by the swinging door of a freight car standing on a
switch of the defendant company. Held, that plaintiff was not as a matter
of law negligent, but that the question of negligence was for the jury, to be
determined from the evidence, all the circumstances of the case being taken
into consideration.
It is the prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for a passenger to
protrude his arm beyond the outer edge of a window on a moving steam
railway car. Todd v. Old Colony R. Co., 7 Allen 207; Georgia Pac. R. Co., v.
Underwood, go Ala. 49; Indianapolis R. Ca. v. Rutherford, 29 Ind. 82; Dun
v. Seaboard R. Co., 78 Va. 645. An attempt has been made to distinguish
between steam and street railway cars as regards negligence of this nature.
Summers v. Crescent City R. Co., 34 La. Ann. i39; Miller v. St. Louis R. Co.,
5 Mo. App. 471; but such distinction has been severely criticised. 2 Wood's
Railway Law, pp. io7, iiO8; Georgia Pac. R. Co. v. Underwood, go Ala. 5I.
Seemingly the only decision which opposes the prevailing view and supports
the present case is Spencer v. M. & P. C. R. R. Co., I , Wis. 487. Chicago
R. Co. v. Pondrom, 51 Ill. 333, and Quinn v. So. C. R. Co, 29 S. C. 38r,
often said to support the Wisconsin case, have been distinguished, and so
are not authority on the issue here involved:
CARRIERS-TAKING PASSENGER BEYOND DESTINATIoN-DAMAGEs.-SMITH
ET ux., V. WILMINGTON & W. R. Co., 41 S. E. 48I (N. C.).-Plaintiff pur-
chased tickets and boarded a train to go to a certain crossing, where there
was no station. The conductor was unable to signal the engine in time and
the train was finally stopped at a considerable distance beyond plaintiff's
destination. At the time she left the train it was raining and the plaintiff
was exposed to the storm. She was afterwards taken ill, but her physician
testified that she would nave been ill anyway. Evidence of mental suffering
was excluded. Held, that a judgment of non-suit was properly ordered.
Douglas and Clark, J J., dissenting.
The majority opinion in this case appears to controvert the settled rule
that carrying a passenger beyond his destination is actionable negligence.
Thompson, Carriers, p. 568; Code (N. C.), Sec. 1963; Raben v. R. R., 75
Iowa 579; Bucher v: R. R., 98 N. Y. 128. Carriers are bound to stop, at
the representation of their agent. Hull v. R. R., 66 Tex. 61g.
Increased risk of injury resulting from condition of health must be
borne by the passenger. Pullman Co. v. Barker, 4 Col. 344. The English
rule also holds that illness resulting from exposure is not a proximate
result of the carrier's negligence. Hobbs v. R. R., L. R. 1o Q. B. rin. In
these cases the. action is considered as founded on contract and not upon
tort, but the latter view has been taken by several courts where the former
authority is severely criticized. R. R. v. Raton. 94 Ind. 474; Browm v. R. R.,
54 Wis. 342.
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COLLATERAL INHERITANCE TAX-SITUS OF PERSONAL PRoPERT.-IN RE
LEWIS' ESTATE. 52 At]. 205 (Pa.).-The intangible personal property of a
non-resident decedent had been, for many years. under the absolute control
of a resident agent. Held, that the property was liable to the collateral
inheritance tax of the agent's domicile.
Pennsylvania decisions have supported the doctrine that the situs of
intangible personal property follows the owner's domicile. McKeen v.
Northampton, 49 Pa. 519; 11 Re Short's Estate.. 16 Pa. 63. But securities
separated from the owner and under the control of a trustee have been
regarded, for purposes of annual taxation, as within the agent's state. Peo-
plC v. Smith, 88 N. Y. 576; Pullman Co. v. Pa., ii Sup. Ct. 876. Not, how-
ever, if the securities are merely deposited with the trustee for safe keeping.
Orcutt's Appeal, 97 Pa. 179.
COMPOSITION WITH CREDITORS-SECRET PREFERENCE-PREFERRED CREDITOR'S
RIGHTS.-In RE CHAPLIN, 8 Am. B. R. 121 (Mass.).-Wf/here a composition
had been agreed upon by all the 'creditors of an insolvent debtor. but one
creditor had received a secret preference; held, that the composition might
be avoided by the innocent creditors, and that the preferred creditor might
retain the amount of the composition, only surrendering the preference.
The courts are almost unanimous in declaring that the secret preference
avoids the composition as to the innocent creditors. The point over which
there has been some controversy is as to the rights of the preferred creditor.
There is a line of decisions in England based upon Howden v. Haigh, ii Adol.
& E. 1033, to the effect that the preferred creditor must lose not only his
preference but also the amount of the composition. Mallalici v. Hodgson,
16 Adol. & E. 689; Knight v. Hunt, 5 Bing. 432. These authorities have
been cited and approved by some courts in this country. Doughty v. Savage.
28 Conn. 146; Frost v. Gage, 3 Allen 56o; Dry Goods Co. v. Harlin, 71
N. W. 16 (Minn.). However, perhaps the better view is to the contrary.
viz.. that the preferred creditor may retain the composition. This does not
deprive preferred creditor of all his rights, but merely punishes him in com-
parison with the innocent creditors, who may regard the composition as
void. The cases bearing on this particular point are few. W~hite v. Kuntz.
107 N. Y. 5T8; Bank v. Blake, 142 N. Y. 404.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DVE PROCESS OF LAw-BILLS OF LADING.-IIS-
SOURI K. & T. Ry. Co. v. SiztoNsox, 68 Pac. 653 (Kan.).-Provision of
Chapter Ioo. Laws of 1893, making the specification of weights in bills of
lading issued by railroad companies for hay, etc., shipped over their lines.
conclusive evidence of the correctness of such weight, held unconstitutional.
as denying to companies due process of law, and to courts the power of
determining the weight and sufficiency of evidence. Doster. C. J.. Smith and
Ellis, J J., dissenting.
In the majority opinion a distinction is drawn between the power of
legiJative authority to prescribe a rule of evidence, (a) that a receipt shall
be conclusive and not open to contradiction by parol: and (b) it- power to ,.,
prt!.cribe as to contracts. They admit such power a, to the contract part
of .bill of lading: they deny it at to the receipt, contending that an e;tupp0-
applied to such a writing would ahut out evidence a to mistake and frand.
making "that conclusive which might not expr,, a contract because of
inherent mistake or fraud." The di.;senting opinion urge that no it", t
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objection, can be raised to such an estoppel where the circumstances of
application are the result of one's own deliberation, and that the giving
of an irrevocable effect to such an. instrument is not unconstitutional. III.
Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557. See Cooley, Consti. Lirm. (5th Ed.) 453.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-HouRs OF LAnoR-VALmiTY.PoPLE V. LOCHNER,
76 N. Y. Supp. 396.-Held, a law providing thAt no employee shall be
required or permitted to work in a bakery more than 6o hours a week, or
more than io hours in one day, unless for the purpose of making a shorter
work day on the last day of the week, is a valid police regulation not in
conflict with U. S. Const., art. 14, sec. I, providing that no Siate shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
the citizens of the U. S.
It has been held tlhat the legislature might prohibit railroads from
permitting or requiring workmen who have worked twenty-four hours to
go oh duty again until they have had eight hours rest. People.v. Phyfe, 136
N. Y. 554. A Utah statute which limited the hours of labor in mines was
held constitutional in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, Brewer and Peckham,
J J., dissenting. In the latter case the only purpose of the statute was to
protect the employee, while in the principal case the health of the general
public is an additional object.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-LBERTY OF CONTRACT.-STATE V. KREUTZBERG, go
N. W. iog8 (Wis.).-Rev. St. 1898, secs. 4466 b., Amended Laws i899, c.
332 of Wis., provided that no person shall discharge an employee because
of his membership in a labor organization. Held, void-as an unconstitutional
restraint on individual freedom.
Statutes almost identical with this were held' void in State v. Julon,
129 Mo. 163, and Gillespie v. People, i88 Ill. 176. Limitations of liberty of
contract have sometimes been upheld as containing an element of bonm fide
police regulations to promote the public health, welfare, comfort or safety,
as in Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (limiting hours of labor in mines);
Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366 (forbidding payment in orders, as within
governmental power to regulate currency); State v. Wilson, 7 Kan. App.
428 (forbidding the screening of coal before weighing, on grounds of govern-
mental control of weights and measures). But other courts have failed to
find the elements of valid police regulations in those provisions, in Braceville
Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66; State v. Hann, 6i Kan. 146; and Ramsey v.
People, 142 II. 38o, respectively, and in general the authorities are in serious
conflict.
CONTRACTS FOR FUTURE DELIVERY-VOID IF" QUANTITY INDETERMINABLE.-
COLD BLAST TRANSP. Co. v. KANSAS CITY BOLT & NUT CO., 114 Fed. 77.-
Plaintiff alleged a contract by which the defendant agreed to deliver, during
six months, certain materials at stated prices, the quantity to be taken not
being specified. Held, void for want of mutuality.
This case is similar to Crane v. C. Crane & Co., io5 Fed. 869, where an
agreement by a wholesale dealer to supply a retailer during a certain time,
at stated prices, with so much of a commodity as the purchaser might require
for his trade, which left it practically optional with the purchaser to increase
or diminish his orders, with the rise or fall of prices, was held void for
want of mutuality. These agreements are to be distinguished from accepted
offers to deliver such articles as shall be needed, required, or consumed by
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an established business during a specified time where there is the implied
agreement that the buyer will purchase all the articles needed of the person
whose offer he has accepted. 'Vells v. Alexander, 13o N. Y. 642: Lumber
Co. v. Coal Co., 3I L. R. A. 529.
CoNTRnovERsY BETWEEN STATES-JuRIsrncTIoN-DvERsIoN OF WATER.-
KANSAS V. COLORADO, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 552.-Held, the Supreme Court of the
United States has original jurisdiction of a controversy between States.
The question raised in this case was whether Colorado had the right to
wholly deprive Kansas of the benefit of the water of the Arkansas river,
which rises in Colorado and flows into and through Kansas.
This case brings to mind the many attempts which have been made to
organize tribunals having cognizance of disputes between sovereign states,
all of which have failed through lack of power to enforce the decrees. The
States of the Union are sovereignties, and under the rules of international
law might settle disputes by treaty or an appeal to force. had not these
attributes of sovereignty been surrendered to the general government. In Rhode
Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 726. 9 L. Ed. 1261, it was held that a com-
plaining State being bound by the prohibitions of the constitution to neither
treat, agree or fight with its adversary, without the consent of Congress, a
resort to the judicial power was the only means left for legally adjusting a
dispute between States relating to a controverted boundary. Colorado
claimed also that Kansas was seeking to maintain this action for the redress
of supposed wrongs of certain private citizens of that State, and that it was
not empowered to bring an action in this court for such purpose. The court
however, followed the case of Missouri v. Illinois, iSo U. S. 208, 21 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 331, where it was ruled that the mere fact that a state had no pecuniary
interest in the controversy would not defeat the jurisdiction of this court.
It might be envoked by the State as parens patriae, trustee, guardian, or
representative of all or of a considerable portion of its citizens.
DAMAGES-NERvOUS PROSTRATION RESULTING FROhi FRIGHT-TRESPASS AS
PROXIMATE CAUSE-RIGHT OF REcOVERY .WATSON v. DILTS, 89 N. V. io68
(Iowa).-Defendant wrongfully entered plaintiff's house in night time,
thereby frightening plaintiff, a woman, and causing nervous prostration
and physical disability. Held, to constitute a good cause of action.
The decisions are practically unanimous that fright alone, caused by an
act of negligence, is not ground for damages; Victorian R. Con'r's v. Coultas,
L. R. 13 App. Cases 222; Mitchell v. Rochester R. R. Co., i5i N. Y. io7;
nor, by weight of authority, does consequent physical disability affect the
legal status of complainant; Ezwing v. Pittsburg R. R. Co., i47 Pa. 4o, 14
L. R. A. 66 and note; although the justice of this conclusion is denied by
text writers. Watson, Personal Injuries, secs. 396-402; Sedgwick, Damages.
8th ed., secs. 46, 47, 86i; Beaven, Negligence, sec. 77 et seq. Many of
the courts base their decision on the rule of convenience. Spade v.Lynn
R. R. Co., 168 Mass. 285. '1 he same position-ab convenienti-is taken by
the courts in regard to mental anguish in the so-called "telegraph" ca.,us.
TV. U. Tel. Co. v. Ferguson, 157 Tnd. 64. Other courts eniphasize the abzsence
of proximate cause. Braun v. Craven, 175 111. 40. In the principal ca.e.
the court, while recognizing the attitude of the law, lays weight upon ihe
wilful trespass as a proximate caiuse to justify its conclusion. Althowigh
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complainant's claim admittedly is stronger than where negligence is the
moving cause, yet even then the law can hardly be said to be in harmony
with this decision. In an early English case, evidence was admitted of
fright of plaintiff's wife to show the outrageous and violent character
of the trespass, but not as a substantive ground of damage. Huxley v. Berg,
I Starkie 98 (I8i). See also Canning v. Williamstown, I Cush. 451 (1848) ;
and the doctrine of these early cases has generally been followed. But in
support of the principal case, see Hill v. Kimbell, 76 Tex. 210; Purcell v.
Railway Co., 48 Minn. 134; Bell v. Railway Co., 26 L. R. Ire. 432.
EvIDENcE-INsTRucTioNs-ExPERT TESTIMONY.-GusTAFSON v. SEATTLE
TRACTION Co., 68 Pac. 271 (Wash.).-Held, that an instruction to a jury that
they treat and weigh with "caution," that part of the testimony of an expert
witness as to his opinion and consider it with reference to the facts upon
which his opinion was formed, was erroneous, as discrediting the testimony
of the expert.
Great confusion is evident as to proper instructions regarding the value
and competency of expert testimony. That the court may draw a distinction,
in its charge, between fact and opinion, see People v. Montgomery, 13 Abb.
Pr. 2o7. That a court may express its own opinion on the facts without being
exposed to reversal, is the decision of both the English and U. S. Federal
courts. Lovejoy v. U. S., 128 U. S. 1i; Rogers' Expert Test., 445. The
weight of authority seems to be that to charge a jury to weigh evidence with
"caution" or even "great caution" is not error. Peop'le. v. Perriman, 40 N.
W. 425; Moye v. Herndon, 30 Miss. 18; Benedict v. Flanigan, I8 S. W. 5o6.
The principal decision, however, is well supported. People v. Seaman, 65
N. W. 203.
Ex MPToN-s-REAL ESTATE PURCHASED WITH PENSION MONEY.-Mc-
INTOSH v. AUBREY, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 56I.-U. S. Rev. Statutes, Sec. 4747
declares that no money due or to become due to any pensioner shall be liable
to attachment, levy or seizure, but shall inure wholly to the benefit of such
pensioner. Held, that real estate purchased by a pensioner with pension
money is not exempt.
In Crow v. Brown, 81 Iowa 344. ii L. R. A. iio, this statute was given
a very different construction. There it was held that if force and effect are
to be given to the clause "inure wholly to the benefit of the pensioner," there
is no escape from the conclusion that property purchased with pension money
is exempt. Yates County National Bank v. Carpenter, 1i9 N. Y. 550, 7 L.
R. A. 557 holds that if receipts from a pension can be directly traced to the
purchase of property necessary or convenient for the support and mainte-
nance of the pensioner and his family such property is exempt from exe-
cution. That statutes of this kind are to be liberally construed, and that their
force and effect are not to be confined to the literal terms of the Act has been
held in numerous cases. The Supreme Court, however, construes the words
of the statute strictly, holding that the protection provided protects the fund
only while in the course of transmission to the pensioner. It is protected
only when "due or to become due." When the money has been paid
to him, it has "inured wholly to his benefit" and is liable to seizure.
RECENT CASES. ,?7
ExPLOsivEs-D31?ING REFUSE ON VACANT LOTS-INJuRY TO CHILDREN.
-T.VELL v. BANNERIMAN, 75 N. Y. Supp. 866.-Defendant, an ammunition
manufacturer, used an unfenced lot as a dumping place for refuse. Plaintiff
was approached by two other boys with a mass of gunpowder found tber,
which exploded, while they were extracting pieces of brass therefrom. Hoid,
that action for injuries would lie, as it was a question for the jury whether
defendant had used proper care. Goodrich, P. J., dissenting.
The court bases its decision on the ground that the presence of brass
in the powder rendered it enticing to children and so brought it within the
rule referred to in the leading case of IValsh v. Railroad, 145 N. Y. 3or. But
there would seem to be good reason for the contrary view, based on the
principle that when a person comes upon the premises of another without
invitation he is a bare licensee, and if any injury is sustained by reason of a
defect in the premises, the owner is not liable. Cusick v. Adamns, 115 N. Y.
55; Larnzorc v. Iron Co.. ioi N. Y. 391. In the recenLcase of Brinkley Car
Works & Mfg. Co. v. Cooper, 67 S. W. 572, the Supreme Court of Arkan-
sas followed Gillespie v. McGowan, ioo Pa. I44, and refused to recognize the
New York doctrine, saying that to follow it to its logical conclusion 'Nould
"charge the duty of protecting children upon every member of the community
except upon their own parents."
HIGHWAYS-PEDESTRIANS-WALKING AT NIGHT-NEGLIGENCE.-SIEC.LER
V. MELLINGER ET AL., 52 Atl. 175 (Pa.).-Plaintiff stied town supervisors for
damages for an injury from a fall sustained, while walking at night, on the
sidepath of a township road. Held, that he was presumptively negligent in
using the sidepath, the middle of the road being, prima facie. the safest
portion for travel at night.
This court seems to have carried the doctrine of presumptive negligence
to an extent contrary to well settled law. A traveller has a right to presume
that a highway in use, including the margin thereof, is reasonably safe for
ordinary travel. Davenport v. Ruckinal, 37 N. Y. 568. He may presume
this at night-time. as well as in daylight. Pettengill v. Yonkers. 116 N. Y:
558. Travellers on country road.,, as well" as elsewhere, are privileged to use
the entire highway as laid out. Siddons v. Garder, 42 Me. 248: Seward T'.
Milfo,'d, 21 Wis. 485.
I NDEM NITY I NSURANcE-ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-NEGLIGENCE IN APPEAL-
BVRDEN OF PROOF.-GETcHELL & MARTIN LUMBER & MFG. CO. V. E.MPLOYERS'
LIABILITY AssUa. Co., LTD., go N. W. 616 (Iowa).--An employer who was
insured against loss for personal injuries to its employees to the amount of
$I.5oo in case of injury to any one employee, was sued by an injured em-
ployee. who obtained judgment for $4.30o. The insurance company had de-
fended the action and agreed to appeal, but on its failure to perfect it in timue.
iudgment was affirmed on motion. In an action by the employer against the
;nutirer for negligence, held, that the burden wa oil the insured to qhow
danmage thereby.
The court refuses to follow the rule laid down in Godefroy V'. Jay. 7 ling.
413 aud followed in !l'hart.. .eg.. Se.t 7=2: .h.,, a,,d Red.. 'eg. (5th -.d.
Section 566. tht where negligence i. shown, resulting in a Judgme:nt ,:''" 11t-.
,he client, the attorney has the brdeii of showing that tle lient w;, not
damaged thereby. The rule has been criticized in otlher ra-ei. Ca:':er v.
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Pulliam, 13 Lea i14; Harter v. Morris, 18 Ohio St. 492. Those cases which
follow Godefroy v. Tay differ from the present case because in them the in-
jured client was a plaintiff whose attorney's negligence lost or diminished the
judgment. Moorman v. Wood, 117 Ind. 144. Here the client was a deiend-
ant, against whom in the lower court judgment had been recovered, and
he must overcome the presumption that the judgment would stand on appeal.
I Grcenl., Ev., Section ig. See also Cox v. Sullivan, 7 Ga. 144.
LicFNsE-REvocATIoN-EsToPPEL-TREspAss. -HicKs ET AL. 1. SwIFT
CREEx MILL Co., 31 So. 947 (Ala.)-The defendant company under a per-
sonal license constructed and operated a ditch and dam on the land of one
Smith. Smith conveyed the land in question to the plaintiff. Held, that the
license of defendant was thereby revoked and that the plaintiffs might main-
tain tresnass against the licensee for his continuance in possession.
The sole question here at issue is whether defendant acquired an irrevoca-.
ble license from plaintiff's grantor; if so, it follows as of course that plaintiffs
would have no right of action. There is an absolute conflict of authorities as
to the effect of the execution of a parol license upon the power of the licensor to
revoke. Such executed license is held irrevocable by many states. Cook v.
Pridgen, 45 Ga. 331; Snowden v. Wilas, ig Ind. Io; Vannest v. Fleming, 79
Iowa 638; Swartz v. Swartz, 4 Pa. St. 353. England and perhaps a majority of
our states hold a license revocable under all circumstances. Adams v. An-
drews, 15 Q. B. 284; Cook v. Stearns, ii Mass. 533; Selden v. Canal Co.,
29 N. Y. 639. Some courts, admitting that the statute of frauds prevents the
creation of an irrevocable parol license, hold in the case of a definite contract
that part performance takes the case out of the statute, and hence equity will
recognize and enforce licensee's right in case of attempted revocation.
McManus v. Cooke, 35 Ch. D. 681; Wisemdn v. Lucksinger, 84 N. Y. 31
MIscoNDucT Or CouNsEL-ImpRoPER ARGUMENT--GRoUND FOR REvERSAL."
-STEWART V. M.ETROPOLITAN ST. Ry. Co., 76 N. Y. Supp. 54o.-Held, that the
misconduct of plaintiff's counsel was not cured by an instruction given at
plaintiff's instance, that "in case either counsel, in summing up stated facts
that were not proven upon the trial, or in case either counsel gave a recollec-
tion of the facts which disagree with the recollection of the jury, the jury
may disregard these statements, and take their own recollection of the facts."
Goodrich, P. J., dissenting.
This would seem to be unsupported by decisions exactly in point. That
a refusal to interpose, where counsel proceed to dilate upon facts not in evi-
dence is legal error is well settled. Williams v. Railroad Co., 126 N. Y. 96;
Mitchum, v. State of Georgia, ii Geo. 616; Tucker v. Hennike4 41 N. I-L
317. But this ground would appear to be absent, where the defendant does
not object at the time, and the judge sees fit to postpone a charge to dis-
regard the irrelevant statements.
SALE ON SmEWALK-THEATER TICKETS-TRANSFERABILTY.-COLLISTER V.
HAYmAN ET AL., 75 N. Y. Supp. iio2.-Held, that an injunction will not be
granted to restrain defendant from refusing to accept theater tickets sold on
the sidewalk.
That a ticket to a race course was a mere license and might be termi-
nated at any time without even returning the purchase price was held in the
early English case of Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 Mees & W. 837. That a thea-
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ter ticket is not salable or transferable was the opinion in Purcell v. Daly,
19 Abb. N. Gas. 3oi. But that a railroad ticket, on the other hand, is trans-
ferable was held by the court of appeals in Tryoler's Case, 157 N. Y. i16. and-
by the U. S. Supreme Court in Hudson v. Kansas Pac. R. Ca-., 3 McCrary
249.
STATUTE OF FRAUDs-REFORMATION OF LEASE-SPEcIFIC PERFORMANCE.-
BuTR v. THRELuxLD r AL, go N. W. 584 (Iowa)-By mutual mistake.
an oral agreement giving lessee an option to buy was omitted from a lease
for five years. Held, that notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds, a court of
equity may correct the lease and enforce it as reformed.
Although regarding this as an indirect enforcement of an oral agree-
ment for the sale of land and a virtual repeal of the Statute of Frauds, the
learned judge feels constrained to follow an early and decisive Iowa case
and the prevailing American doctrine. Ring v. Ashworth, 3 Iowa 452;
Gillespie v. Moon, 2 Johns. Ch. 585; Schwass v. Hershey, 125 Ill. 653;
Strickland v. Barber, 76 Mich. 31o; Bisphain, Prin. Eq., Sec. 382. The English
rule, followed by many authorities in the United States, admits parol evidence
to defeat specific performance, but will not enforce a parol variation. Town-
shend v. Stangroon, 6 Ves. 328; Elder v. Elder, IO Me. 8o; Pierce v. Col-
cord, 113 Mass. 372; 24 Am. Law. Reg. 81.
TAXATioN-EDucATIONAL INSTITUTIONs-OERA HOUSE TAX.-MARKHAM
V. SOUTHERN CONSERVATORY OF MUSIC, 41 S. E. 531 (N. C.) Under a law
taxing opera houses, but exempting entertainments for educational objects
the" sheriff endeavored to collect taxes from the defendant, which gave public
musical entertainments, charging an admission fee. Held, that the defendant
was exempt from taxation.
While the fee charged for admission to concerts given by a school of
music was for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the entertainment,
no profits being realized, still it is not clear how that fact in itself renders
a musical entertainment solely educational. From an educational standpoint,
this attempted distinction between the opera and a school concert seems at
best very artificial-
TRADE NAME-MISLADING PUBLIC-RIGHT TO TRADE UNDER OwN
NAiSE.-J AND J. CASH LImITED V. JOSEPH CASH, 86 Law Times Rep. 211
(Eng.).-The defendant sold out to the plaintiff company and became one
of its directors. He retired as director, and set up in the same class of
business at the same place as Joseph Cash & Co. Held, plaintiff could not
be restrained from carrying on trade is his own name. but he must take
reasonable precaution to clearly distinguish his goods from those of the
plaintiff, and to prevent the public from being led into the belizf that his
business was that of the plaintiff.
The lower court restrained defendant from selling frilling under the
name of Cash, but this court was of the opinion that the order went too
far, and modified it Williams L. J. said that there never had been a case
yet where a man has been restrained altogether from carrying on a particular
trade in his own name. Every decision has been limited to restraining him
from carrying on a trade, the products of which when used in connection
with a particular trade name, have become identified with the business of
another person. without taking such steps as any honest man would wish to
